IN THE judgement of the case–Sunil Kumar alias Sudhir Kumar & Another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh delivered on May 25, 2021, Justice Dinesh Maheshwari and Justice Aniruddha Bose, at the Supreme Court have made it abundantly clear once again, that it is legally obligatory for the Court of first instance (Trial Court), while awarding multiple punishments of imprisonment, to specify in clear terms as to whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively. The omission to State whether the sentences awarded to the appellants would run concurrently or would run consecutively essentially operates against the accused because, unless stated so by the Court, multiple sentences run consecutively as per the plain language of section 31(1) CrPC read with expositions in the decisions of the cases –Muthuramalingam v. State (2016) 8 SCC 313 and O.M.Cherianalias Thankachan v. State of Kerala –(2015) 2 SCC 501.

 

The other omission to State the order of consecutive running cannot ipso facto lead to concurrent running of sentences. Faced with the position that the stated omissions will not, will not by themselves, provide a room for concurrent running of sentences, the appellants’ counsel has endeavoured to invoke the ‘single transaction’ principle. In the SC’s view, the said principle is essentially referable to section 220 CrPC, which provides that if more offences than one are committed in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, then the accused may be charged with and tried at one trial for every such offence. In a given case, after such trial for multiple offences, if the accused is convicted and awarded different punishments, concurrent running thereof may be provided depending on the facts and the relevant surrounding factors.

 

This principle related with ‘single transaction’ cannot be imported for dealing with the question at hand. In its decision of the case – Mohan Baitha & Others v. State of Bihar (2001) 4 SCC 350, the SC Chas observed that the expression ‘same transaction’ from its very nature, is incapable of an exact definition and it is not possible to enunciate any comprehensive formula of universal application for the purpose of determining whether two or more acts constitute the same transaction. The question involved in that case did not relate to sentence but to the inquiry and trial of different offences pertaining to sections 304-B, 498-A, 120-B and 406 IPC and territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate in Bihar when the alleged incident constituting one of the offences under section 304-B IPC had taken place in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Ofcourse, in the decision of the case – Mohd. Akhtar Hussain alias Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti v. Assistant Collector of Customs (Prevention), Ahmedabad & Another – (1988) 4 SCC 183, the Supreme Court has indicated that if a transaction constitutes two offences under two enactments, generally it is wrong to have consecutive sentences, but such a rule shall have to application, if the transaction relating to the offences is not the same or the facts concerning the two offences are quite different.

 

Significantly, in that case, consecutive running of sentences awarded to accused-appellant, in two different cases pertaining to the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 and the Customs Act, 1962 was upheld by the SC with the finding that the two offences for which the appellant was prosecuted were ‘quite distinct and different’. The only modification ordered by the Supreme Court was concerning the term of imprisonment for the latter conviction while disapproving its enhancement from 4 years to 7 years by the High Court after noticing that he was already sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 7 years in the first offence. The legal precedents cited essentially proceeding on their own facts do not make out a case for interference in favour of the appellants.

 

 

The SC has very firmly indicated that it was not inclined to accept the principal part of the submissions of the appellants’ counsel. However, the other part of his submissions, that requiring the appellants to serve a total term of 22 years in prison would be highly disproportionate to the actual punishment they need to suffer in this case, cannot be brushed aside as altogether unworthy of consideration. Even when Section 31(2) of CrPC is not directly applicable, some of the relevant features of the present case are that the offences in question were committed in the year 2008, that is before amendment of IPC in 2013; the appellants have continuously have served about 13 years and two months of imprisonment and nothing adverse in regard to their conduct while serving the sentences has been placed on record. In the given set of circumstances, the court pondered over the question as what ought to be the order for a just balance between the requirements of punishment on one hand and reasonable release periods for the appellants on the other, while keeping in view the overall scheme of awarding punishments and execution thereof, including the ancillary aspects referable to sections 433 and 433A CrPC as also section 55 IPC whereunder, serving a term of 14 years even in the sentence of imprisonment for life is the bottom line (subject to the exercise of powers of commuting by the appropriate Government in accordance with other applicable principles). After anxious consideration of all the relevant factors, the court has been of the view that the requirements of complete justice to the cause before the court could adequately be met by providing that the maximum period of imprisonment to be served by the appellants shall be 14 years and not beyond.

 

The SC has stated that in view of the overall circumstances and principal subject matter of this appeal, it finds no reason to re-open the issue, which was not taken up by the appellant-2 at the relevant stage. In view of this, in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the SC modified the sentence in the manner that maximum period of sentence to be served by the appellants shall be 14 years and not beyond. This order was passed “only in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case”. However, HC’s order regarding payment of fine and the default stipulations have been kept intact in terms of the order passed by the Allahabad High Court on February 21, 2018. While closing the case, in result, the SC partly allowed the appeal, reminding all concerned of its observation in the decision of the case –Nagraja Rao v. Central Bureau of Investigation-(2015) 4 SCC 302, that it needs hardly an emphasis that any omission to carry out its obligation by a Trial Court to specify as to whether the sentences of imprisonment awarded by it would run concurrently or consecutively causes unnecessary and avoidable prejudice to the parties – both the accused and prosecution.