IN THE judgement of the two cross criminal applications between the identical parties - Haji Sheikh Hussain Abdul Jabbar and Six others v. State of Maharashtra (through Police Station Lakadganj, Nagpur) and Mohd. Hanif Abdul Rashid, delivered on November 4 2025, at the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court. Justice Urmila Joshi-Phalke and Justice Nandesh S Deshpande (the author of the judgement), have in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, very clearly stated that the power under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not to be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution only on the basis of a settlement between the parties. Tausif Ahmad, the applicant -2 in the Cr. Application 1207/2025 is the Non-applicant in the Cr. Application 1203/2025 and is the complainant. Likewise, the applicant-5 in 1203/2025, Mohd.

 

Hanif Abdul Rashid is the non-applicant-2 in the Cr. Application 1207/2025. Through the application 1207/2025, quashing of the FIR 213/2015 lodged against the applicant by the NA-2 was sought against the applicant at the behest of the NA-2, for the offences punishable under sections 307, 143, 147, 148, 149 and 452 of IPC.Facts are similar regarding the Cr. Application 1203/2025 excepting that there is section 452 IPC is not there. Additionally Sections 4 and 5 of the Arms Act are there. In both the applications. the applicants had unsuccessfully sought quashing of respective FIRs and Chargesheets. As was observed by the Court in the decision-State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi (2014) 15 SCC 29, “the Court’s principal duty while exercising powers under section 482 of CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings, should be to scan entire facts to find out the thrust of the allegations and the crux of the settlement.”

 

Furthermore, by relying upon the judgements of Gian Singh and Narinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab (2014) OnLine 265, this Court has observed that when it comes to a question of compounding an offence under section 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC, by no stretch of imagination it can be held to be an offence as between the private parties simpliciter. Such offences will have a serious impact on society at large. The accused are facing trial under section 307 as the offences are definitely against Society and the accused will have to necessarily face trial come out unscathed by demonstrating their innocence. The same view has been reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Deepak (2014)10 SCC 285 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Manish - (2015) 8 SCC 307. Thus, the common thread emerges from perusal of these judgements that the HC should be slow enough to quash the FIR and the chargesheet only on the basis of the settlement for the offences punishable under 307 of the IPC and the Arms Act. Thus, such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions, which involve heinous and serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, as such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. The FIR 213/2015 and the corresponding chargesheet invoke offence under section 307, 143, 147, 148, 149, 452 of the IPC read with sections 4 and 25 of the Arms Act. In the indoor inquiry certificate, assault with head injury is shown. A knife is recovered from the applicant-4. A sword was recovered from applicant-3. A iron rod was recovered from the applicant-7. A kukri was also recovered from the shop.

 

All these weapons and clothes have blood stains over them. The injury report clearly states that these injuries are possible with some of these weapons.This report a;so shows a head injury. In the report of NA-2, in the Application 1203/2025, there is specific reference of use of sword and injuries were caused due to it. Even the statements of witnesses speak about the use of sword. “Moreover, the Trial Court has recorded in its judgement on June 27, 2017 that at the threshhold stage, the Police could not have concluded regarding the aspect of provocation, which is an element to be dealt in the course of evidence and trial. So also, the Police could not have made their opinion in view of the cross report filed by accused against the informant and others. Both the reports and cases are different and the material of one case could not have been considered in another case.

 

The report and statements clearly spell out that victim has been wounded on his head with a sword and so also informant saved himself from the ghastly attack of sword on his neck. It could be also read from the report that the accused were armed and one of them, Abdul Hanif (Accused -12) exhorted other accused to kill the informant and others. “The Vital aspect for an offence u/s 307 IPC is the intention and not the nature of injury. Perhaps, there may not be any injury still having an intention to kill would make out a case u/s 307. Viewed from this angle, the opinion of Medical Officer cannot be given much weight at this juncture of the case. “In evaluation, the HC is of the view that prima facie a case under sections 143, 147, 148, 307 read with sections 4 and 25 of the Arms Act has been made out qua accused. Hence, accused needs to be summoned to answer the charge and face the trial for the offences under sections 143, 147, 148, 307 read with section 349 IPC and sections 4 and 25 of the Arms Act.”

 

The Administrative Office of the Trial Court was directed to register this case in the nature of warrant trial. In this case, dangerous weapons have been found and recovered from the accused persons in both cases. There is evidence of use of these weapons by the accused persons their clothes have been found with blood stains. In view of this the HC’s considered view is that only because of settlement between the parties, it would not be proper to quash the First Information Report and the consequent chargesheet. The judgements in the cases of Narider Singh and Naushey Ali, even speak of the offences under section 307 would fall in heinous and serious offence. It is true that only offence under 307 IPC is invoked in the matter, but that would not deter this Court from exercising jurisdiction. However, looking to the fact that dangerous weapons have been seized from the accused persons, it would not be a proper case to exercise inherent jurisdiction under the section 482 of CrPC and in view of this, the High Court here, has rejected both the applications.