THROUGH the common judgement delivered by Justices M. S. Sonak and Jitendra Jain, at the Bombay High Court in Mumbai, have allowed the writ petitions filed by Kisanlal Bairudas Jain and several other land-owners, on May 9, 2025 with declaration that the Supreme Court’s decision in the case – Union of India v. Tarsem Singh and others- (2019) 9 SCC 304 applies to all these cases, entitling all these petitioners to the statutory benefits of interest and solatium on par with the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

 

The petitioners in all these cases, were aggrieved with the compensation amount determined and, therefore, applied for the matter to be resolved through Arbitration as provided under section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956. The Arbitrator so appointed made an award, enhancing the compensation. However, the benefit of decision of the Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh was not granted. Therefore, the petitioners filed petitions under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. A common order and judgement by Principal District Judge, Nashik (PDJ) disposed of these on May 4, 2023. He, in fact, agreed with the petitioner’s contention that they were entitled to solatium and interest, in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Tarsem Singh’s case.

 

The PDJ has recorded that even the National Highway Authority expressed willingness to pay the solatium component from the decision date in Tarsem Singh. However, the PDJ, being bound by the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Rishabh Kumar v. Secretary to Government of India- 2021 SCC OnLine Bombay, 4561, felt disabled to modify the Arbitrator’s Award and grant relief to the petitioner in terms of the decision in the Tarsem Singh’s case. This is evident from paragraphs 25 to 26 of the PDJ’s order disposing of such petitions under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Incidentally, in the Rishabhkumar’s case view has been taken that what the PDJ in the petition under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, could not do, the same cannot be done by the Appellate Court under section 37 of the Arbitration Act. In such circumstances, the Court stated that it cannot appreciate the NHAI’s stance of raising the plea that these petitions should not be entertained because the petitioners have an alternate remedy under section 37 of the Arbitration Act. It is well settled that the rule of exhaustion of alternate remedies a self-imposed restriction on exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Before applying this Rule, the court must see whether the alternate remedy is indeed efficacious.

 

There is no point in relegating the petitioners to the remedy under section 37 of the Arbitration Act, when the relief they claim cannot be granted under such proceedings. In the case of M/s Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. the Excise and Taxation Officer cum Assessing Authority and others in Civil Appeal 5393 of 2010, decided on February 1, 2023, (384)ELT 8 (SC), the Supreme Court had interfered with the dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court because the petitioner had not availed the alternate remedy. The Supreme Court, at that time noted that such dismissal was improper because the HC failed to examine whether an exceptional case was made out. Mere availability of an alternate remedy of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision would not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court and render a writ petition ‘not maintainable’.

 

Where the controversy is purely legal one and it does not involve disputed questions of fact but only involve questions of law, then it should be decided by the HC instead dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an alternate remedy being available. There is no serious dispute regarding the facts or applicable law in these petitions. The PDJ has held that the petitioners are entitled to the benefits in terms of Tarsem Singh decision. The NHAI offered such benefits from the date of the judgement. The so-called alternate remedy is ineffective. There is no benefit in relegating the petitioners to avail themselves of such an alternative remedy, thus depriving them of the benefits to which they are entitled. In all these cases, there is no dispute about the petitioners being entitled to the benefits of the solatium and interest under the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Tarsem Singh. Even the counsel for the NHAI had fairly submitted before the PDJ that the NHAI was willing to pay solatium component, though from the date of the decision in Tarsem Singh’s case. After all this, to raise the objection based on alternate remedy in this Court appears to be extremely unfortunate and unfair on the part of the NHAI.

 

It cannot take diversion stances. Ultimately these are statutory benefits. The entitlement has been never seriously disputed. Even the PDJ, in terms, held that the petitioners were entitled to such benefits given through the Tarsem Singh decision. These are not adversarial proceedings. Since the petitioners claimed only statutory reliefs in terms of the Tarsem Singh decision, the Court saw nothing wrong in the petitioners invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the HC under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The HC has also relied upon reasoning in its order of April 8, 2025, disposing of the Writ Petition No. 11932 of 2019 and connected matters. In this order, the petitioners had directly petitioned the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. NHAI counsel fairly conceded and the HC was satisfied that the cases were covered by the Tarsem Singh decision. Accordingly, directions were issued to grant the petitioners the statutory benefits in terms of the Tarsem Singh judgement. The HC also overruled objections to maintainability of these petitions on the grounds of alternate remedy and allowed all these petitions with direction to the NHAI to pay to the petitioners the statutory benefits of solatium and interest in terms of the Tarsem Singh judgement within four months without requiring the petitioners to institute any contempt petition for non-compliance.