By Rahul Dixit :
The White House call to Munir was not to discuss the gains or losses in the conflict with India but it encompassed ways to push US interests in the Asian region with the security and Intelligence cover of Pakistani troops. It was a routine give-and-take between the Master and its Errand Boy. It
neither changes the ground reality or
hopeless economic
situation in Pakistan nor it brings any substantial alteration in the security situation in India.
THE excessive pride of getting an opportunity to gorge on goat cheese gateau and a rack of lamb in the White House with United States President Donald Trump turned into embarrassment hours later for Pakistan Army Chief Asim Munir when America’s B-2 stealth bomber ripped through Iran’s largest nuclear facility. Munir’s perceived complicity in the US plan was flagged even as Tehran noted it as a betrayal. In Islamabad, Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif took an egg on the face for his Government’s outrageous haste in demanding the Nobel Peace Prize for Trump.
Within hours, Pakistan was in the Birthday Suit, sparking anger within and mockery outside the country.
But, did it bother the military generals and civilian leadership in Pakistan?
NO.
It was just a daily routine for the rogue nation that willingly runs errands for the West without remorse. Persistent mortification is an inevitable consequence of this policy for Pakistan but it hardly matters as it keeps manipulating American anxieties to keep its position of a primary rival for India in the region. The country will keep celebrating the White House invitation to Munir even as he shrewdly makes his way to the list of military generals finding a place in the good books of America.
The reception to Munir did cause some anxieties in India as media commentators termed it as a diplomatic setback for New Delhi after the highly-successful Operation Sindoor. It was also seen as a snub for Prime Minister Narendra Modi by the US President. Political experts in India and Pakistan were busy deciphering signals emerging from White House after the meeting between Trump and Munir. For India, it was a geopolitical reality that New Delhi has already factored in while making its moves.
The stark reality of continuous American help to Pakistan is not new. India has experienced it since independence. Successive dispensations in Washington have seen Pakistan as an able partner to run its agenda in the region. Historical accounts have shown how the US changed its priorities and partners as it zeroed in on the oil fields of the Middle East. The US State Department had identified Pakistan way back in the 1950s as a pawn willing to become an access door to the Middle-East. Pakistan’s military chief, Gen Ayub Khan, had reached out to America seeking a role in the US plans for the Middle-East. The American establishment was more than happy to accommodate a country run by an army, based at a strategic location.
The oil fields in Iraq and Iran were too tempting for the US to ignore Pakistan’s diabolical plans for India as it decided to arm its troops. The then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, had concurred that without Pakistan, there was no way to defend the Middle East.
Pakistan has been manipulating the American insecurities to get supplies worth millions for its air force and army, line of credit, weapons, and relentless funding to its ‘social security programmes’. The political leaders in Washington have continued this policy and have always insisted on hyphenating India and Pakistan. Despite the concerns raised by India on Pakistan’s diversion of US funds to terror activities, proposals to arm Pakistan have always found overwhelming political traction in the United States. In fact, Richard Nixon, then serving as Vice President of the US, had told the National Security Council that he would like to do everything for the people of Pakistan as they have less complexes than the Indians.
Even today, hardly anything has changed in American policy.
There is no effort to de-hyphenate India and Pakistan despite marking New Delhi as a high-value strategic partner in critical sectors. It is a fact that India has to live with. There will be no binaries for the US and it would be prudent for the larger Indian society to see the situation with pragmatism. In fact, the US policy was stated in a profound manner just a few days ago by US Army General Michael Kurilla when he said that the US has to have a relationship with Pakistan. Kurilla explained the necessity of having a relationship with Pakistan to run its operation against the IS in Khorasan Province of Afghanistan. Such ‘necessities’ have been cropping up since decades and Pakistan has leveraged its geographical position to the hilt to gain from it. With such history and continued unrest in the region, the US suddenly snapping ties with Pakistan despite knowing its complicity in launching terror attacks on India is impossible.
Pakistan stands at a unique position having direct access and influence in Afghanistan, Iran, Central Asian region and Bangladesh.
The White House call to Munir was not to discuss the gains or losses in the military conflict with India but it encompassed ways to push US interests in these regions with the security and Intelligence cover of Pakistani troops. It was a routine give-and-take between the Master and its Errand Boy. It neither changes the ground reality or hopeless economic situation in Pakistan nor it brings any substantial alteration in the security situation in India. The gun-for-hire has been picked to fight the Master’s battle at a cheap rate. Pakistan and Munir will do the job without any shame.
The only concern for India from the US humouring of Munir is the situation in Bangladesh. There has been an alarming rise in visits of Pak army officials to Dhaka ever since Mohd Yunus took charge of the interim Government following Sheikh Hasina’s ouster. Top Bangladesh generals have called for enhanced military cooperation during their meetings with Munir. These are signals of emergence of a new regional chessboard for India to navigate.