HAVING the considered opinion that it would be neither appropriate nor proper for the Court to interfere with the impugned decision in exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly having regard to the well-settled parameters governing the exercise of jurisdiction in matters relating to the award of public contracts, the writ petition filed by M/s G.H. Khandelwal, on the subject, could not win favour of the Bombay High Court division Bench at Nagpur, consisting of Justice Urmila Joshi –Phalke and Justice Nivedita P. Mehta has dismissed the petition on April 23, 2026.

 

The petitioner has challenged the action of the respondent-Amravati Municipal Corporation in respect of e-tender for the maintenance and repair of roads within municipal limits of Amravati, whereby the technical bid submitted by petitioner came to be rejected and the bid of the respondent-4, was found responsive and taken forward for opening of the financial bid. The Petitioner has challenged rejection of its technical bid as well as the consequential acceptance and further processing of the bid of respondent-4. The petitioner is a registered partnership firm engaged in execution of civil contracts, particularly road construction, maintenance and allied infrastructure works. It is duly registered as a Class IV with the PWD, Amravati, State PWD as well as Amravati Municipal Corporation. It is the case of the petitioner that it has successfully completed several municipal contracts of similar nature in the past and hold valid works completion certificates issued by the said authority.

 

The respondent -1, issued an e-tender on November 28, 2025 for maintenance and repair of road, patches, potholes at various places in Amravati, worth about Rs 1.59 crores. The central controversy revolves around interpretation of Clause 3(‘J’ in Devnagari) of the tender condition, which requires the bidder to complete similar work during last three financial years of approximate value of Rs one crore. The HC has pointed out that a plain reading of the Clause thus indicates some degree of ambiguity inasmuch as it does not expressly stipulate whether the value is to be achieved cumulatively or within a single year. However, it is equally well settled that in the matters of tender interpretation, the author of the tender documents is the best judge of its requirement and its interpretation ordinarily be accorded deference as held in Afcons Infrstructure Ltd. v.

 

Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. and another –(2016) 16 SCC 818-Paragraph 15. The purpose underlining such eligibility criteria I to ensure that the bidder possesses demonstrable technical and financial capacity to execute works of substantial magnitude viewed in this context, the interpretation adopted by the respondents, that the bidder must demonstrate execution of the work of comparable State within a defined time-frame, cannot be said to be irrational or arbitrary. Even assuming that the Clause is capable of a different interpretation as suggested by the petitioner, the Court would not be justified in substituting its own interpretation in place of that adopted by the tendering authority. Unless interpretation adopted is categorically unreasonable or established by the mala fides judicial restraint must prevail. The record further indicates that upon initial scrutiny the petitioner had not furnished the work done certificate in conformity with the Clause 3 (‘J’).

 

Thereafter, a opportunity was granted to the petitioner by the communication of December 10, 2025 to submit the requisite documents. However, upon detailed scrutiny by the tender evaluation committee around four deficiencies were noted. Evaluation of such documents is a matter requiring technical expertise and administrative assessment. Tender evaluation committee being the designated expert body has undertaken such evaluation and recorded its findings. The Court did not find any material to indicate that the decision is arbitrary, perverse or based on extraneous consideration. The conclusion that the petitioner failed to meet the eligibility criteria is a possible and reasoned one, based on the material placed before the Committee.

 

The contention of the petitioner, that it was denied an opportunity to clarify the alleged deficiencies is also not borne out from record. The communication of December 10, 2025 clearly indicates that an opportunity was granted to the petitioner to furnish the requisite documents, which the petitioner availed. Once, such an opportunity was provided and the documents were duly considered, it cannot be said that there is any violation of principles of natural justice. In tender matters, the application of principles of natural justice is neither rigid nor formalistic; the requirement is of firmness in action. Once an opportunity to cure defects has been provided, the bidder cannot claim an indefinite right to further clarification. The decision-making process, therefore, cannot be faulted on the grounds of violation of principles of natural justice. The petitioner’s submission that the technical evaluation and opening of financial bids took place in close proximity of time also does not advance his case. Mere proximity in timing, by itself, does not advance its case and establish arbitrariness o lack of fairness, particularly, when the record indicates that the process of scrutiny and evaluation has been also undertaken and the petitioner had been afforded an opportunity to submit documents. Mere relationship between bidders cannot been an inference of collusion. What one has to establish in such a case, is that the tendering authority has abused its dominance or that the competent bidder is ousted as a result of anti-competitive practices. None of these, to the petitioner’s prejudice is evident in this case. The tender document does not prohibit participation by related entities. In absence of any material to demonstrate bid-rigging, price manipulation or lack of independent decision –making, the allegation of cartelisation remains in realm of conjecture and cannot be a ground for judicial interference in the present factual matrix. Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. Whatever material is, but that is not sufficient to conclude that the tender process was vitiated by collusion. In conclusion, the has HC appeared firm on opinion that its rejection of the petitioner’s technical bid is based on reason and objective assessment of documents and does not suffer from arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity. The HC declined to stay the operation of the Judgement.