The Indian String
    Date :09-Jul-2026

Distinct View
 
By Rahul Dixit : 
 
Benefits of the redrawing of the security map in the Indo-Pacific are already on the table. After the Philippines, Indonesia is set to purchase BrahMos missiles from India. Two strategically located countries in the IOR will be part of the larger security calculus led by India. Building close defence ties with Jakarta hands India a monitoring status at four major chokepoints.
 
WHEN he met United States President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the G-7 summit in France last month, there was a subtle shift in tone and tenor of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The famous bear hug was given a go-by as Modi met the maverick President in person after16 long months. His approach to Trump was different; not too much closeness but never letting him feel that India was averse to carrying on strategic relations with the US. This was despite the wrong noises made by the Trump administration and the unilateral decisions demeaning India and its people. Modi presented India as an equal during the bilateral meeting and sent out a strong signal to the world that India is ready to chart its own course.
 
A glimpse of the separate course is now on the table as India has opened a new diplomatic arc to establish itself as the power-centre in the Indo-Pacific region. How India has swiftly changed the game was reflected in the visit by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi last week. It underscored a key shift as India and Japan moved from traditional partners to find a strategic convergence. Their shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific has become the point of convergence as both face the threat of Chinese aggression in the maritime domain and waning interest of the Trump government in ensuring security of the Indo-Pacific. Japan regards India as an important partner in advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific. And both countries have realised the urgent need of keeping only strategic relations with the US instead of relying fully on Washington to safeguard the Indo-Pacific. That the US is no longer interested in the security of the Indo-Pacific can be gauged from the removal of the word Indo from the US Indo-Pacific Command.
 
Recently, the Trump administration renamed it to its original US Pacific Command. It might look like a simple change of name but in the world of diplomacy such optics are loaded with substance and signals. The latest move, coming on the heels of the tariff bombs, appeasement of Pakistan, nonsensical meddling in India’s internal affairs, and derision of India’s people and economy, has confirmed that New Delhi is being pushed out from Washington’s vision for South-East Asia, especially the Indo-Pacific. Despite its assurance that nothing would change in the geographical jurisdiction, trusting the US will prove highly detrimental to India’s maritime security. This reason is at the core of the strategic visits by Prime Minister Modi to Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand. All these countries form a valuable island chain in the Indian Ocean as well as the larger Pacific region. All have been facing direct or indirect threats from the Chinese navy. And all have been rubbed the wrong way by the US with high tariffs. India is out to engage this island chain on its own terms without targeting any country.
 
The island chain, including a countries like the Philippines, forms a solid grouping with strategic geographical locations in the Indo-Pacific. India is seeking a bold step of redrawing the map of this vast maritime region and establishing itself as the most-dependent security provider. It has always advocated a rules-based order which prompted a move to revive the Quad grouping. The bloc was a perfect counter-weight for China but is suffering from a forced inertia due to the American misadventure of tapping Beijing as a partner. It is another lofty dream by Trump with a hope that China will be eager to form the G-2 grouping with America. The idea is set to die a natural death. However, till it happens, India will have to find its own security architecture to keep the crucial oceanic region free from Chinese aggression. The PM’s visit needs to be seen from this larger context as New Delhi makes efforts to converge the autonomies in the larger Indo-Pacific region into a self-sufficient channel helping each other in multiple domains, including maritime security and critical resources.
 
The move stems from the threat to supply chains caused by geopolitical tensions. It is part of India’s strategy of diversification with total focus on resources catering to energy, food, and critical minerals needed for its semiconductor dreams. It is an effort to cut down dependence on a single power holding supply chains. The island chain fits perfectly in this strategy. Benefits of the redrawing of the security map in the Indo-Pacific are already on the table. After the Philippines, Indonesia is set to purchase BrahMos missiles from India. Two strategically located countries in the IOR will be part of the larger security calculus led by India. Building close defence ties with Jakarta hands India a monitoring status at four major chokepoints. Indonesia virtually controls the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Ombai-Wetar which are key routes into the South China Sea.
 
With a defence deal and pacts in sharing of key resources, India secures a maritime theatre where China is seeking total control with its naval aggression. Modi’s next stops, Australia and New Zealand, might be far away from the IOR but they form an important axis in securing the Indo-Pacific. New Delhi and Wellington have already embarked on a fresh start with a Free Trade Agreement. Similar is the story with Canberra which is seeking a larger Indian role in its development story. With Indonesia and Japan, these two Trans-Tasman countries can help India start an independent global supply chain and reduce dependence on a single source. In these disruptive times, it will be a direct message to China about a joint front and also to the US that India no longer sees it as a reliable partner.