A RECENT 27-year, four million-tonne liquefied natural gas (LNG) Qatari export agreement with China, the longest in gas export history, highlights different Gulf state approaches to navigating big power rivalry between the People’s Republic and the United States. Widely seen as giving China a grip on Qatari gas, the deal is as much a commercial agreement as it is a security arrangement. It acknowledges China as the Gulf state’s foremost export market and gives China a stake in protecting Qatar. Qatar is not alone in giving China preferential access to its energy reserves. So do other major Gulf exporters, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for whom China has become their foremost market. The difference is that Qatar’s energy dealings with China are embedded in a policy that broadly aligns the Gulf state with the United States, emphasises the Gulf state’s utility as a go-between, and avoids ruffling feathers. In contrast, Saudi Arabia and the UAE stress their independence, on occasion counter or distance themselves from the policies of the United States, the region’s security guarantor, and sometimes poke the US in the eye. Last month, the contrast was on full display.

 

While UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed raised eyebrows as the only head of state to attend the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani flew under the radar a week later when he met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Bin Zayed “has made a sport out of rebuffing the Biden administration’s efforts to repair the relationship” between the United States and the UAE. “Of course, from his own perspective, Bin Zayed has proved himself a loyal partner to the United States time and again, but of late has had little to show for it,” said scholars Jonathan Lord and Airona Baigal. In a further illustration of the contrast, Qatar arranged a meeting between a senior Venezuelan and US official last month to improve strained relations resulting from the United States’ recognition of Opposition leader Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s legitimate President and US sanctions against the South American state. Officials said the talks could lead to a prisoner swap. A seemingly unlikely candidate to mediate with which it has no ethnic or religious affinity, Qatar was well-positioned because it had neither joined a large number of Governments recognising Guaido nor adhered to the sanctions. Qatar’s refusal failed to upset Washington. Similarly, Qatar hosts a Taliban office at the US’ request.

 

Hosting facilitated the 2021 negotiated US withdrawal from Afghanistan and US-Taliban contacts since then. With the withdrawal underway, Qatar, like the UAE, provided significant logistical assistance. Furthermore, Qatar, at times, mediates between the US and Iran and serves as a postman relaying messages between the two countries. At the same time, Qatar, unlike the UAE, has not emerged as a haven for Russians seeking to circumvent US and European sanctions. As a result, the US has sanctioned Emirati rather than Qatari companies for violating US sanctions on Russia and Iran. Moreover, Emirati freewheeling has landed the UAE on the grey list of the FATF, an international anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering watchdog. Furthermore, Qatar has ensured that it is less dependent on Chinese telecommunications technology that the US fears could give China access to US technology embedded in American weapons systems and other security projects. Last year, the US rewarded Qatar, home to the largest US military base in the Middle East, by awarding major non-NATO ally status.

 

Saudi attitudes have been compounded by perceptions that “the US security umbrella has been weakened as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned… (That) convinced Saudi leaders that they had to look elsewhere to guarantee their security,” Shihabi said. He was referring to a US refusal to come to the Kingdom’s aid when Iran in 2019 attacked Saudi oil facilities. He was also referring to a US cutoff of arms and ammunition sales because of the Saudi intervention in Yemen. In the same vein, Karen Elliot House, an expert on the Kingdom, quoted a Saudi Minister as saying in March in a closed-door conference: “You tell us not to talk to Russia, your opponent, but you are talking to Iran, our opponent. You say don’t buy Chinese weapons. ‘Do you have an alternative,’ we ask? ‘Yes,’ you say, ‘but we can’t sell it to you.’” Even so, North America remains a primary investment target of Emirati and Saudi sovereign wealth funds. Last year, the US$829 billion Abu Dhabi Investment Authority allocated between 45 and 60 pc of its investments to North America. (IPA)