By Adv. R. S. Agrawal 

 

 

 

IN THE decision of the case – K B Lal Krishna Bahadur Lal v Gyanedra Pratap and Others, delivered on April 8, 2024, Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Prasanna B Varale, at the Supreme Court, have observed that it is clear that the appellant has been grossly negligent in pursuing the matter before the trial court. Thus, the trial court, the revisional court as well as the High Court, were correct in dismissing the belated claim of the appellant. According to the SC, in this case, the main question is of delay. Should an inordinate delay, which has no reasonable explanation be condoned? Whether an application filed by the appellant, under Order IX, Rule 7 of the CPC can be allowed, after a delay of almost 14 years, is the only question before the Court. Was there a sufficient cause for filing such a belated application? Although the term ‘sufficient cause’ has not been defined in the Limitation Act, it is now well-settled through a catena of decisions that the term has to be construed liberally and in order to meet the ends of justice. The reason for giving the term a wide and comprehensive meaning is quite simple. It is to ensure that deserving and meritorious cases are not dismissed solely on the ground of delay. There is no gainsaying the fact that the discretionary power of a court to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and it is not to be exercised in cases where there is gross negligence and/or want of due diligence on part of the litigant (Majji Sannemma alias Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Others(2021) 18 SCC 384).

 

The discretion is also not supposed to be exercised in the absence of any reasonable, satisfactory or appropriate explanation for delay - P K Ramchandran v. State of Kerala and Another - (1997)7 SCC 556. Thus, it is apparent that the words ‘sufficient cause’ can only be given in section 5 of the Limitation Act a liberal construction, when no negligence, nor inaction, nor want of bona fide is imputable to the litigant (Basawaraj and Another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer –(2013) 14SCC 81). The principles, which are to be kept in mind for condonation of delay were succinctly summarised by the Apex-Court in the judgement –Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others – (2013)12 SCC 649 and have been reproduced as under: “21.1. (i) there should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condoning delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. “21.2. ( ii) The terms,” sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. “21.3 (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. “21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. “21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. “21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. “21,7. (vii) Concept of legal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. “21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former, doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted.

 

That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. “21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. “21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted, or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.” The appellant before the Supreme Court had challenged the order passed on May 19, 2022 by the Allahabad HC by which the petition filed by the appellant under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was dismissed. The appellant had invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court against the order of March 28, 2022 of the Additional District Judge, Barabanki, who had upheld the order of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Barabanki, passed on October 7, 2021.

 

The dispute between the parties to this appeal relates to a piece of land situated in village Gharsaniya, Pargana Dewa in Tehsil Nawabganj of Barabanki District, which was sold by one Kalawati to one Mansaram vide Sale-deed of March 30, 2006. Thereafter, the property was sold by Respondent-5-Mansaram to the appellant herein through the sale-deed of April 13, 2006. On April 22, 2006, civil suit for permanent injunction and cancellation of the sale-deed of March 30, 2006 was filed by the respondents – 1 to 3 herein, before the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Barabanki, wherein the appellant herein was the Defendant-3 in the suit. It was contended by the respondents 1 to 3 before the trial court that the respondent-4 had no transferrable right or title over the property when the sale-deed of March 30, 2006 was executed in favour of the respondent-5 and thus, the property could not have been sold to the respondent-5. The respondents claimed that they were the joint owners of the suit property and were also in possession of the same because the predecessor –in-interest of the property was their uncle and he had executed a will deed on May 20, 1997 in their favour. In conclusion, the Supreme Court has stated that it finds no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Allahabad High Court on May 19, 2022 and the HC had dismissed the appeal.